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RECENT DECISIONS

FINALITY-REvIEW
OF DEIMMIGRATION-ADMINISTRATIVE
PORTATION ORDER UNDER ADmINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr.-The

appellant, Trinler, was ordered deported from the United States because he failed to maintain the "treaty merchant" - status under which
he was admitted. He sought judicial review of his deportation order
before he was taken into custody for deportation, claiming this right
under the Administrative Procedure Act, 2 in spite of the fact that
Section 19 of the Immigration Act of 1917 3 recites that ".

. the

decision of the Attorney General shall be final." Held, for the appellant. The Act did enlarge the rights of persons against whom
deportation orders have been issued, and they are now entitled to
judicial review after issuance of .the deportation order. While it may
appear that judicial review was precluded under the provisions of
Section 19 of the Immigration Act of- 1917, in practice such determination was never final because of the availability of habeas corpus.
United States ex rel. Trinler v. Carusi, 166 F. 2d 457 (C. C. A. 3d

1947).
In personal liberty cases habeas corpus was always available as
a means of judicial review 4 despite statutory recitals that decisions
of the administrative agencies shall be final. 5 In the instant case,
however, the petitioner seeks review, not by way of habeas corpus
but under the Administrative Procedure Act.6 The court first applied the doctrine of "administrative finality" to determine whether
the petitioner had exhausted all of his administrative remedies, because judicial intervention is denied where the petition is prematurely presented.7 The Commissioner of Immigration argued that
143 STAT. 154 (1924), 8 U. S. C. §203 (1946).
A treaty merchant is one
of a class of persons who can enter the United States without regard to the
quota assigned their country, but only upon condition that they maintain the
exempt status under which they were admitted. When they deviate from and
therefore fail to maintain this status they are in the United States illegally and
are subject to deportation.
2 60 STAT. 243, 5 U. S. C. § 1009 (1946).
339 STAT. 889 (1917), as amended, 54 STAT. 1238 (1940), 54 STAT. 671
(1940), 8 U. S. C. § 155 (1946).
4 Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 66 L. ed. 938 (1922).
5Judicial constructions have diminished the finality effect of such recitals,
requiring more forceful expressions of finality before construing that the intent
is to preclude judicial review. Examples are the Economy Act of 1933, 48
STAT. 9 (1933), 38 U. S. C. § 705 (1946); Kirkland v. Atlantic Coast Line
R. R., 167 F. 2d 529 (App. D. C. 1948); United States v. Miroch, 88 F. 2d
888 (C. C. A. 6th 1937); Kabadian v. Doak, 65 F. 2d 202 (App. D. C. 1933),
cert. denied, 290 U. S. 661, 78 L. ed. 572 (1933) ; cf. Reynolds v. United States,
292 U. S. 443, 78 L. ed. 1353 (1934); United States v. Williams, 278 U. S.
255, 73 L. ed. 314 (1929) ; First Moon v. White Tail, 270 U. S. 243, 70 L. ed.
565 (1926) ; Auffmordt v. Heddon, 137 U. S. 310, 34 L. ed. 674 (1890) (construing language "final and conclusive" to be final enough).
6Hereinafter referred to as the "Act."
7 Falbo v. United States, 320 U. S. 549, 88 L. ed. 305 (1944) ; Rochester
Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125, 83 L. ed. 1147 (1939) ; United
States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161, 48 L. ed. 917 (1904) ; United States ex rel.
Eisler v. District Director, 76 F. Supp. 737 (S. D. N. Y. 1948) (review denied
because administrative remedy of bail was not sought).
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the administrative processes do not terminate until the petitioner is
taken into custody to be placed on a ship for deportation. However,
the court held that the taking of a person into custody, and later
placing him on a ship for deportation are ministerial acts and are not
a part of the administrative process, which came to an end with the
issuance of the deportation order.
Previously, habeas corpus was the only form of proceeding which
the courts sustained as a method of preventing deportation,8 and then
only where flagrant error appeared.9 It may appear that such procedure would liimit substantially the instances in which a court could
intervene. In later decisions,' 0 however, the application of this form
of proceeding was considerably expanded from the apparently limited
orbit suggested by earlier cases." Courts have intervened by way of
habeas corpus where (1) the order of deportation was not supported
by substantial evidence; 12 (2) the Attorney General was not acting
within the scope of his authority; 13 (3) the petitioner was not accorded a fair hearing; 14 (4) the petitioner was in custody under an
order of deportation for an unreasonable length of time.' 5 Formerly,
there was substantial support for the proposition that the writ of
habeas corpus was a collateral challenge rather than a direct review
of the administrative action. 16 The dissent, in the instant case, urges
that habeas corpus is in reality a new suit to enforce a civil right,
and not a proceeding in the course of the original action. In repudiation of this argument the majority opinion of the court finds an intent on the part of Congress to enlarge the right to review rather
than to limit it. Therefore, where a right of review existed before,
it may now be enforced under the Act. Every person adversely affected by the final determination of an administrative agency is .now
entitled to judicial review. 17 The reviewable acts include those made
8 Kabadian v. Doak, 65 F. 2d 202 (App. D. C. 1933), cert. denied, 290
U. S. 661, 78 L. ed. 572 (1933); cf. Poliszek v. Doak, 57 F. 2d 430 (App.
D. C. 1932) (denying writ of prohibition); Fafalios v. Doak, 50 F. 2d 640
(App. D. C. 1931), cert. denijed, 284 U. S. 651, 76 L. ed. 552 (1931) (denying
equitable relief to cancel deportation) ; Rash v. Zurbrick, 6 F. Supp. 390
(E. D. Mich. 1934) (denying equitable relief to enjoin deportation).
9 Vajtauer v. Commissioner, 273 U. S. 103, 71 L. ed. 560 (1927).
10Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135, 89 L. ed. 2103 (1945); Ng Fung Ho
v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 66 L. ed. 938 (1922).
11 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 37 L. ed. 905 (1893);
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651, 35 L. ed. 1147 (1892).
12 Bridges v. Wixon, supra note fM'.
13 Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32, 68 L. ed. 549 (1924) ; Gegiow v. Uhl, 239
U. S. 3, 60 L. ed. 114 (1915).
14 Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U. S. 454, 64 L. ed. 1010 (1920).
15 Ross v. Wallis, 279 Fed. 401 (C. C. A. 2d 1922); Lisafield v. Smith, 2 F.
2d 90 (W. D. N. Y. 1924).
16 Vajtauer v. Commissioner, supra note 9.
1760 STAT. 243, 5 U. S. C. § 1009 (1946).
This section permits judicial
review of agency action to any person adversely affected except "so far as
(1) statutes preclude judicial review, or (2) agency action is by law committed to agency discretion."
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final by statute and those final agency actions for which no other
adequate remedy exists.1 8 While application of the Act does not
substantially enlarge the petitioner's remedy, it may make it more
effective in that it is available sooner.Although this decision has already been followed, 19 there is considerable opposition to it outside of the courts; 20 nor is there any
assurance that the Supreme Court21will follow it in view of their most
recent pronouncements of policy.

B. F. N.
INSURANcE-LIFE INSURANcE-ACCIDENTAL DEATH BENEFITS
-MILITARY
SERVICE EXEMPTION CLAUSE.-The court was called

upon to construe the meaning of a clause exempting the insurance
company from paying double indemnity while the insured is in military service. The defendant insurance company had issued on August 3, 1936, two policies of life insurance, each for $500, on William
Jorgenson. The plaintiff, his wife, was named beneficiary. Each
policy contained a provision to the effect that if the insured died as a
result of an accident double indemnity would be paid. Each policy
also contained the provision, "No Accidental Death Benefit will be
paid if the death of the Insured is the result of self-destruction ...
or while the Insured is in military or naval service in time of war."
On October 18, 1944, the insured, a member of the U. S. Army, was
on duty at Bangolore, India. While on town patrol the motorcycle
on which he was riding became involved in an accident, and the insured suffered a fractured skull from which he later died. The beneficiary submitted proof-of-death and a claim for $1,000 under each
policy. The company paid $500 on each policy, refusing to pay the
additional $500 for accidental death on the ground that the insured
i860 STAT. 243, 5 U. S. C. § 1009c (1946), provides: "Acts reviewable.
Every agency action made final by statute and every final agency action for
which there is no other adequate remedy in any court, shall be subject to judicial review. .. "
"IUnited States ex reL. Cammarata v. Miller, 79 F. Supp. 643 (S. D. N. Y.
1948).
20 The Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization has steadfastly insisted that the Act does not apply to his agency, 8 I. & N. S. Monthly Review
105 (1947); and a bill was submitted to the 80th Congress to make the
Act inapplicable to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. H. R. 6333
(Hobbs 1948).
21 Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., - U.. S.
92 L. ed. 367, 369 (1948). "This court has long held that statutes which
employ broad terms to confer power of judicial review are not always to be
read literally. Where Congress has authorized review of 'any order' or used
other equally inclusive terms, courts have declined the opportunity to magnify
their jurisdiction, by self-denying constructions which do not subject to judicial
control orders which, from their nature, from the context of the Act, or from
the relation of judicial power to the subject-matter, are inappropriate for
review."

